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This paper models a two-period media contest between two po-
litical candidates campaigning to win an election. Two main cases
are examined. In the ﬁrst case voters behave as unbiased Bayesian
updaters when assessing political information. The second case con-
siders voters suﬀering from conﬁrmatory bias. In the ﬁrst case I ﬁnd
that candidates spend equal amounts of their campaign funds in both
periods in equilibrium. In the second case, candidates spend more
in period one. A candidate with better media access (in period one)
does, however, better if voters suﬀer from conﬁrmatory bias than if
they do not.
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11 Introduction
Large sums of money are spent on campaign expenditures in connection
with elections worldwide.1 This fact has attracted much research on how
campaign spending aﬀects vote shares. Jacobson (1978) pioneered this ﬁeld
by regressing campaign expenditures on vote shares in the 1972 and 1974
House and Senate elections in the US where he found a positive correlation.
Later studies have conﬁrmed this eﬀect.2 This research has primarily focused
on how aggregate spending before an election has aﬀected voter support.
However, an election campaign is clearly a dynamic phenomenon. Kenny and
McBurnett (1992) recognize this fact and study empirically how the timing
of campaign spending aﬀects voter support. They ﬁnd that a candidate
loses voter support if he waits extraordinarily long to spend his campaign
resources. This paper will try to shed some light on why timing may be
important in election campaigns. I will do so by focusing on how voters are
aﬀe c t e db yc a m p a i g ni n f o r m a t i o n .
Psychologists have examined how individuals process information in gen-
eral and one phenomenon, conﬁrmatory bias, appears especially fruitful at
explaining the Kenny and McBurnett results.3 Conﬁrmatory bias is the ten-
dency of an individual to ”...misread evidence as additional support for initial
hypotheses“4 In other words, the individual will treat information that goes
against his current beliefs with suspicion and tend to misread the same in
support of his beliefs. Rabin and Schrag (1999) model formally how individ-
uals suﬀering from conﬁrmatory bias systematically misperceive information
in favor of old hypotheses which to a large extent has inﬂuenced this pa-
per. Zaller (1992) describes how voters exhibit a partisan bias such that
they tend to resist persuasive campaign messages that are inconsistent with
their political predispositions. The phenomenon of partisan bias appears to
be a special case of the more general phenomenon of conﬁrmatory bias. It
therefore seems lika a fruitful approach to model voter behavior in a model
of conﬁrmatory bias.
Applying conﬁrmatory bias to voters would imply that once a voter has
decided whom to vote for, it will be diﬃcult to change his mind. Therefore
it would make sense for political candidates to convince voters sooner rather
than later.
1See for example Kenny and McBurnett (1994) for the case of the USA.
2Green and Krasno (1990) and Nagler and Leighley (1992) study the eﬀects of aggregate
campaign spending on elections in the USA while Palda and Palda (1998) do the same for
France, and Pattie, Johnston, and Fieldhouse (1995) for the UK.
3See for example Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979).
4Rabin (1998), p 26.
2This paper will test this intuition formally by setting up a game-theoretic
model analyzing the eﬀect of timing of campaign resources on voter support.
A representative voter forms his opinion on whom to vote for based on cam-
paign information in the media from the two candidates during two periods
before the election. The candidates decide how much of their campaign funds
t os p e n de a c hp e r i o dw h e r em o r ef u n d sa r ea s s u m e dt oy i e l dm o r ev o t e rs u p -
port. I will examine two cases. In the ﬁrst case the voter behaves as an
unbiased Bayesian updater and in the second case he exhibits conﬁrmatory
bias. I show that as the degree of conﬁrmatory bias increases, the larger is
the share of campaign funds that both candidates spend in period one in
equilibrium.
Elections often involve an incumbent and one (or many) challenger(s).
The interaction between these candidates is often asymmetric in nature. In-
cumbents usually have access to larger campaign funds and have better media
access which has given rise to a policy debate concerning for example cam-
paign subsidies and/or limits to campaign spending. I examine whether the
presence of conﬁrmatory bias would increase the advantage of incumbency
or not. I show that it does so with respect to asymmetric media access, but
not with respect to asymmetric budgets.
The purpose of this model is to investigate how conﬁrmatory bias may
aﬀect the timing of campaign spending. My aim is to isolate this eﬀect and
I therefore abstract from many other relevant factors. Such factors are for
example; alternative use for campaign funds, fund raising issues5,v o t e r s ’
tendency to forget, voters’ age, sex, race, education, family income, etc.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a benchmark model
which describes the basic strategic interplay and how a representative voter
receives campaign information under the assumption that he behaves as an
unbiased Bayesian updater. Section 3 applies conﬁrmatory bias to the model
developed in section 2 assuming a symmetric setup. Section 4 analyzes the
eﬀect of conﬁrmatory bias on an asymmetric setup with respect to the size
of campaign budgets and media access. Section 5 has the conclusion.
2A b e n c h m a r k m o d e l
Consider an election where a representative voter chooses between candidates
A and B. Assume that candidate A is the incumbent and that voting for A
yields a payoﬀ of one for sure. Candidate B is a challenger, not previously
known to the voter. Voting for B yields a payoﬀ of zero or X>0.C a n d i d a t e
5See Morton and Myerson (1992) for a model of the importance of timing with respect
to fund raising.
3B wants to convince the voter that voting for him will yield X and not zero
while candidate A wants the voter to think the other way. Θ is the subjective
probability that the voter assigns to voting for candidate B y i e l d i n gap a y o ﬀ





Figure 1. The voter’s choice.
The voter will vote for A if 1 > (1 − Θ)X and B otherwise. The beliefs
of the voter are aﬀected by gathering political information in the media
during two periods. Assume that the only information the voter receives
is messages sent by the two candidates which are broadcast in the media.
Moreover, factors such as age, sex, family income, party aﬃliation etc aﬀect
voting decisions. However, for expositional clarity I only consider how the
campaign spending by the candidates aﬀect the voter.
The voter draws a representative sample of A-a n dB messages each period
from the media. Based on the quantity of A-a n dB messages he forms a
probability assessment, θt, that voting for B will yield a payoﬀ of zero. In the
mind of the voter, the messages make up a signal which has a correlation of
θt to candidate B yielding zero. Candidates inﬂuence θt by buying messages,
Ci
t,i= {A,B},t= {1,2}, in the media during two periods. The voter









4where θt is deﬁned to equal 0.5 if CA
t +CB
t =0 . θt therefore corresponds
to the relative success of candidate A’s campaign in the mind of the voter
in period t. The relative success of candidate B’s campaign then equals
1 − θt. Thus, the more messages a candidate buys the more persuasive is
his campaign. This speciﬁc functional form of the contest success function
is chosen for its simplicity and wide use, for example in the rent-seeking
literature.6 Zaller uses the same functional form to deﬁne the probability
that a voter will give a (pre- election) survey response in support of candidate
A.7
Both candidates have a given endowment of campaign funds, ωi ,i =
{A,B}, which is assumed to have no alternative use apart from buying mes-
sages. Assume also that the price of a message in either period for either
candidate equals one. The process whereby the voter receives campaign in-













Figure 2. Information ﬂow.
The voter thus receives two signals with correlations θ1 and θ2. These
are then used by the voter, in accordance with standard Bayesian updating,
to determine his ﬁnal beliefs as represented by Θ. Formally (see appendix
section A.1 for derivation);
Θ = prob(B yields zero | θ1,θ2)=
θ1θ2
θ1θ2 +( 1− θ1)(1− θ2)
(2)
H e n c ew eh a v eag a m ew h e r et h ep l a y e r s ,c a n d i d a t e sA and B,w a n tt o
maximize Θ (candidate A)a n dminimize Θ (candidate B). Note that Θ
does not correspond to candidate A’s vote share. This could be achieved by
incorporating a distribution over voters’ preferences on X into the model.
6See Hirschleifer (1989) and Skaperdas (1996) for a discussion about diﬀerent contest
success functions.
7Zaller deﬁnes CA (CB) as the number of considerations in favor of candidate A (B)
in the mind of the voter. When the voter is to answer a survey, he then makes a random
draw from the total number of considerations available in his mind which determines his
response. Considerations are formed by persuasive messages in the environment of the
voter where these messages sometimes are rejected as outlined above.
5However, this would not alter the analysis as the candidates still want to
optimize their timing of campaign spending. In order to keep the model as
simple as possible I therefore refrain from using such a distribution.
Inserting equation 1 into equation 2 yields candidate A’s maximization






















































































































Using equation 7 we derive the best response strategy for candidate A,



















Should, however, candidate B allocate all his funds in period one, CB
1 =
1,CB
2 =0 ,o ri np e r i o dt w o ,CB
1 =0 ,CB
2 =1 , any interior allocation is
6optimal for candidate A; CA∗



















Figure 3 illustrates candidate A’s best reply correspondence:








Figure 3. Candidate A’s BR correspondence.
We need, however, only consider interior solutions since a Nash equilib-
rium with both candidates spending all of their budgets in periods one or two
would mean that there would exist incentives for unilateral deviation. For
example, if both candidates allocate all funds to period one, the resulting Θ
would then be 0.5. Should candidate A, however, deviate and reallocate an
arbitrarily small sum, ε, from period one to period two, he would win the
period two media contest completely, that is, θ2 =1 . The resulting Θ would
then be equal to one, that is, total victory for candidate A.B y s y m m e t r y ,
the same argument applies to candidate B.
Assuming an interior solution, it is apparently optimal to keep a constant
presence in the media arena. The intuition for this result is that since the
marginal eﬀect of another CA
1 is positive, but exhibits diminishing returns
(see appendix, section A.2), and the two periods are treated equally by the
voter, it is best to spread the campaign eﬀort evenly. That is, since the prices
for sending messages in both periods are equal, the only way to equalize
7marginal returns from campaign spending is to allocate half the budget each
period. One might have suspected that the opponent’s allocation of campaign
resources would matter, but since it comes in symmetrically for both periods,
it is always optimal to spend half the budget each period. This can be seen in
the ﬁrst term in equations 5 and 6 where the product of candidate B’s period
one and two spending, CB
1 CB
2 , enters symmetrically in both equations.
In this section it has been assumed that the voter takes all messages from
the media at their face value. That is, the voter does not reinterpret them in
any way, only weighs them together as to create a signal on which to base his
decision. The next section looks at what happens when the voter processes
the information more actively, that is, when he interprets the information
based on his (possibly biased) state of mind.
3I n c o r p o r a t i n g c o n ﬁrmatory bias
Psychology research has shown that people exhibit diﬀerent kinds of judge-
ment biases where conﬁrmatory bias is one of them.8 Conﬁrmatory bias is
usually presented in a context where an individual has to decide which state
of the world is actually true, based on ambiguous information. In this model,
however, there is no ”true state of the world“ since we do not know if voting
for candidate B will yield a payoﬀ of X or zero. Nor do we know the true
probability distribution. A voter simply forms his subjective opinion based
on information emanating from the two candidates. Thus we have not deﬁned
what is true or false but what matters is which candidate the voter thinks
will yield the greatest payoﬀ. Obviously, since voters have blank minds with
respect to the new candidate B a tt h eo u t s e to fp e r i o do n e ,i tw o u l da p p e a r
important for the candidates to inculcate a large support in the electorate
in period one as this would bias people to interpret information favorably
during the next period. I will examine this intuition formally.
Note that I use the term interpret information and not misinterpret in-
formation. This simply follows from the assumption that there is no right or
wrong, only diﬀerent assessments about the probability that candidate B’s
policy will yield a payoﬀ of zero. A candidate A message, for example, could
thus either be taken at face value, or, be interpreted, even though the sender
of the same is never in doubt, as a message urging me to vote for candidate
B.
A related psychological phenomenon, called anchoring, describes how peo-
ple tend to anchor on possibly arbitrary values when they have to estimate an
uncertain quantity and do not adjust their estimate suﬃciently when more
8See Rabin (1998) for a survey.
8information is available.9 In this model this would mean that a voter would
tend to anchor his ﬁnal assessment of the probability that candidate B will
yield zero on his assessment from period one. The voter would thus not fully
take into consideration the information he gains in period two compared to
an unbiased Bayesian updater as in the previous section. We will see later
whether this holds true in the model or not.
The setup for this model is identical to the one presented in section 2 with
the addition of the voter now suﬀering from conﬁrmatory bias. The voter is
assumed not to have an opinion, or prior, about candidate B at the outset of
period one and all messages will be taken at face value. However, the voter’s
mind is no longer blank in period two since he by now has formed an opinion
about the probability that candidate B’s policy yields a payoﬀ of zero. The
voter is biased in favor of candidate A if he has received a period one signal
with θ1 > 0.5 and biased the other way if θ1 < 0.5. He will now actively
evaluate the messages he receives from the media and will be biased towards
interpreting messages in favor of his opinion. This is close to Zaller’s model
where people tend to resist arguments against their political predispositions.
However, while Zaller assumes that the voter’s allegiances are predetermined
exogenously, I allow his allegiences to be dynamically determined by the ﬂow
of political messages.
The probability that he will interpret a message from candidate A as a B
message equals q(1 − θ1) while the probability of interpretation in the other
direction equals qθ1.T h u s ,t h em o r ep r o - c a n d i d a t eA the voter is (higher θ1),
t h em o r el i k e l yh ei st oi n t e r p r e tB messages as A messages and the less likely
to interpret information the other way. q represents the degree to which a
voter actively interprets messages with q ∈ [0,1] where q =0corresponds to
a voter always accepting messages at their face value and q =1represents
a voter who actively interprets all messages based on his frame of mind. A
higher q thus increases the severity of conﬁrmatory bias. For example, if a
voter has a prior of θ1 =0 .7, the probability of interpreting a supportive
A message as a B message equals q(1 − θ1)=0 .3q while interpreting a
conﬂicting B message as an A message occurs with probability qθ1 =0 .7q
where the latter is strictly greater than the former. The diﬀerence will also
be greater the larger is q.
If the voter reinterprets a message he thereby decides that the message
is an argument for the other candidate and the message enters the relative
success function (equation 1) accordingly. Reinterpreting a message thus
means that the voter ﬁnds the argument in the message not convincing,
wrong or plain silly with the consequence that he perceives it as an argument
9Rabin (1998), p 29.
9for voting for the other candidate. The ﬂow of information and the voter’s













Figure 4. Information ﬂow with conﬁrmatory bias.
Given the period one signal, the ﬁnal number of messages the voter per-
ceives as supporting candidate A in period two will then be a share (depend-
ing on the size of the media sample which we can assume to be one) of all
A messages sent minus the number of A messages that are interpreted in
support of candidate B plus the number of B messages that are interpreted
to support candidate A. The same argument applies for the number of B
messages. Formally:
Number of perceived A messages = C
A









2 + q(1 − θ1)C
A
2
Given the number of perceived A-a n dB messages in period two, the
perceived correlation of the period two signal can be simpliﬁed to10:
θ
0
2 = θ2 + q(θ1 − θ2) (12)
where we can see that candidate A will gain from conﬁrmatory bias as
long as θ1 > θ2 for q>0.T h i si m p l i e st h a ti ti si m p o r t a n tt od or e l a t i v e l y
better in period one than in period two. Hence, if θ1 > θ2, then candidate
A will gain from conﬁrmatory bias since q(θ1 − θ2) > 0.C o n ﬁrmatory bias
thus reinforces the ﬁrst impression of the voter.
We see that the voter exhibits conﬁrmatory bias in the sense that he is
more prone to interpret conﬂi c t i n gm e s s a g e sa ss u p p o r t i v ea so p p o s e dt ot h e
opposite. However, equation 12 also tells us that the voter perceives smaller
deviations from his prior than the unbiased voter of section 2 which indicates
10See appendix section A.3.
10behavior associated with anchoring. We can see this by computing the diﬀer-
ence in perceived signal correlation ﬁrstly for an unbiased Bayesian updater
voter and secondly for one who suﬀers from conﬁrmatory bias. The unbiased
Bayesian updater voter accepts messages at their face value and does not en-
gage in any reinterpretation so the diﬀerence simply equals θ1−θ2. The diﬀer-
ence for the voter who reinterprets messages equals θ1−θ0
2 = θ1−θ2−q(θ1−θ2).
We note that the ﬁrst two terms on the right hand side equal the diﬀerence in
the unbiased Bayesian updater case while the third term represents the eﬀect
of conﬁrmatory bias. Further, the third term carries the opposite sign to the
sum of the ﬁrst two terms and is, for 0 >q>1, also smaller than the same.
Therefore, the absolute diﬀerence in perceived signal correlation between the
two periods is smaller for a voter suﬀering from conﬁrmatory bias than for
one who is not. Hence, the model links conﬁrmatory bias to anchoring since
voters not only have a net tendency to interpret conﬂicting information as
supportive but also tend to make insuﬃcient adjustments from their initial
assessment in any direction.
We can see from equation 12 that if the degree of conﬁrmatory bias is
very strong, q =1 , then, θ0
2 = θ1. This means that only the signal in period
one is relevant as all messages are subject to reinterpretation. Should there,
however, be no reinterpretation of information, that is, q =0 , then the voter
acts as an unbiased Bayesian updater and perceives the signal correlation in
period two, θ0
2,a sθ2. That is, he weighs both signals equally. Let us for now
assume that there exists some conﬁrmatory bias within the electorate, thus
q ∈ (0,1). The subjective probability that a voter will hold that candidate
B’s policy will yield a payoﬀ of zero is then:
Θ =
θ1[θ2 + q(θ1 − θ2)]
θ1[θ2 + q(θ1 − θ2)] + (1 − θ1)(1− [θ2 + q(θ1 − θ2)])
(13)
This corresponds to equation 2 with the added feature of reinterpreta-
tion of information. Note also that setting q =0will reduce equation 13
to equation 2. As before, candidate A wants to maximize Θ subject to its
budget constraint while candidate B wishes to minimize the same. Insert-
ing the budget equation and taking the ﬁrst order condition of equation 13
yields a best response correspondence which in the open interval CB
t ∈ (0,1)
(as opposed to the case with an unbiased Bayesian voter) is a function of
candidate B’s strategy. Unfortunately, this expression is too lengthy for a
convenient analytical representation. However, ﬁgure 5 plots candidate A’s
best response correspondence for ωA = ωB =1and q =0 .4.








Figure 5. Candidate A’s BR correspondence.
As candidate B’s problem is symmetric, we can see from ﬁgure 5 that
we can restrict attention to interior solutions when solving for the Nash
equilibrium. Assuming symmetry we can simplify the ﬁrst order condition
and solve for CA∗









Both candidates allocate half of their funds to period one plus a fraction
ωq
2 . T h em o r et h ee l e c t o r a t es u ﬀers from conﬁrmatory bias (higher q)t h e
more campaign funds are allocated to period one. Figure 6 illustrates the
eﬀect of diﬀerent degrees of conﬁrmatory bias on the equilibrium strategies
(only interior parts of the correspondences are plotted):














Figure 6. Diﬀerent degrees of q.
Points A through C represent the equilibria for increasing degrees of con-
ﬁrmatory bias. Note that in this symmetric case, both candidates allocate
the same quantity in period one whereby θ1 = θ2 =0 .5. Hence, there is no
eﬀect from conﬁrmatory bias in the mind of the voter (see equation 12) since
he receives the same correlation in both periods. However, it is the potential
for this eﬀect that pushes both candidates to allocate more funds in period
one.
Thus the intuition that candidates focus on period one if voters suﬀer
from conﬁrmatory bias appears to be correct. Before looking at the eﬀect
from conﬁrmatory bias on a game where I allow for asymmetric budgets and
media access, I will brieﬂy comment on some of the similarities and diﬀerences
between this model and the one of Rabin and Schrag (1999).
In the model of Rabin and Schrag a person forms beliefs about which
state of the world is true, A or B, based on independently and identically
distributed signals. These signals are correlated to the true state of the world
to a certain degree which is given exogenously. Starting with a prior, agents
then update their beliefs based on the signals they receive. However, if an
agent is biased, that is, he thinks that either A or B is more likely than
the other, he may misinterpret a signal which conﬂicts with his beliefs as
being supportive. For example, an agent thinks that state A is true with
probability 0.7.H ei st h u sb i a s e di nf a v o ro fs t a t eA and if he receives a B-
signal, which goes against his beliefs, he will misinterpret this as an A-signal
with probability q. q thus reﬂects the severity of conﬁrmatory bias of the
13agent. The probability of misinterpreting a conﬂicting signal as supportive is
thus constant and does not depend on the strength of the individual’s beliefs.
My model has many similarities with the Rabin and Schrag model but
diﬀers from the same on three main points. Firstly, as opposed to the exoge-
nously given correlation in the Rabin and Schrag model, the correlation of
the signals in the model of this paper is endogenous and determined by the
relative campaigning eﬀorts of the two candidates. Secondly, in my model,
the probability that a representative voter reinterprets (misperceives in Ra-
bin and Schrag terms) conﬂicting information as supportive is a function of
his strength of beliefs. Thirdly, the Rabin and Schrag model allows biased
agents only to misinterpret conﬂicting information while I allow agents to
reinterpret also supportive information assuming that the probability of in-
terpreting conﬂicting information as supportive is strictly greater than the
probability of interpreting supportive information as conﬂicting. Thus, the
voter has a net propensity to interpret conﬂicting information as supportive.
Should I, however, assume that voters only reinterpret conﬂicting mes-
sages, as in the Rabin and Schrag model, then the above anchoring eﬀect
would only work in one direction. For example, a voter who is biased in
favor of candidate A,t h a ti sθ1 > 0.5, would tend to overestimate the signal
correlation in period two, while a voter biased in the other direction would
tend to underestimate the same (remember that a high signal correlation
means high support for candidate A).
Matthew Rabin has raised the important issue of whether it is correct to
apply Bayesian updating to modelling voter behavior.11 One may question
whether the messages from the candidates can be regarded as information or
not? One interpretation would be to consider the messages as really contain-
ing information helping the voter to make an informed decision. Another is
to assume that the voter behaves as if it was information. Much of political
messages is about projecting positive images of candidates, that is, about
packaging and not so much about policy contents.12 I suggest that if this is
the case, the voter still forms his opinion in such a way that the methodolog-
ical framework of Bayesian updating can be applied. Even though the voter
may not fully comprehend the real policy content and its implicaitons, he will
vote for the candidate he thinks will yield the most utility. This assessment
is then to a large extent dependent on how the candidates have been able to
present themselves in the media.
11The discussion in this paragraph is inspired by a question raised by Matthew Rabin.
12See Biocca 1991, p 11.
144 Asymmetries
Elections between incumbents and challengers are asymmetric in nature.
There are usually two main advantages to incumbency; better access to ﬁ-
nancial resources and easier access to the media.13 Incumbents generally
have access to larger ﬁnancial resources and can more easily raise more cam-
paign funds than challengers. Obviously, this will empower incumbents to
launch more persuasive media campaigns and it has been debated how policy
measures, such as spending limits and/or campaign subsidies, could level the
playing ﬁeld.14 The advantage of incumbency with respect to media access
comes from journalists’ need of exciting stories from candidates of proven
newsworthiness. An incumbent is not only a candidate for re-election, he
is also an oﬃcial in charge of public aﬀairs and therefore a source of news.
A challenger, on the other hand, will have to prove his newsworthiness by
showing that he is a serious candidate, which will take some time. In this
paper we can obviously model the ﬁrst advantage by giving the incumbent a
larger budget. The second advantage can be analyzed by setting a lower price
for the incumbent to send messages in period one, reﬂecting media’s greater
interest in him. Period two prices are again equal between the incumbent
and the challenger reﬂecting the increased interest in the challenger.
How will then conﬁrmatory bias aﬀect the advantage of incumbency? I
analyze this by comparing the case with conﬁrmatory bias to the one without.
We ﬁrst look at the case with asymmetric budgets and go on to asymmetric
media access.
4.1 Rich versus poor candidates
In the case of an unbiased Bayesian updater voter equations 9 and 10 tell us
that both candidates will allocate half their campaign funds each period. A
smaller ωB, for example, will simply shift the interior section of candidate
B’s best response correspondence to the left and have no eﬀect on candidate
A0s correspondence. Candidate B will of course not be able to launch a
campaign of the same persuasiveness as before and loses voter support. This
is illustrated in ﬁgure 7 below:
13On the advantage of better ﬁnancial resources see for example Green and Krasno
(1990), Jacobson (1978), Krasno, Green and Cowden (1994) and for media access Graber
(1980).
14See for example Kenny and McBurnett (1994).















Figure 7. Asymmetric budgets, q =0 .
Would the advantage of candidate A be stronger or weaker if we assume
that voters suﬀer from conﬁrmatory bias? As we no longer can assume
symmetry, the derivation of the equilibrium becomes rather complex (see












ωB (1 + q)
2
(16)
Both candidates will allocate a given share (
(1+q)
2 ) of their budget in period
one. The equilibrium allocation of campaign funds in period one is therefore
independent of the size of the other candidate’s budget. This is illustrated in
the graph below (for q =0 .4) where point A corresponds to the symmetric
case (ωA = ωB =1 )and points B and C represent the equilibria for smaller
ωBs:
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Figure 8. Asymmetric budgets, q =0 .4.
Candidate B’s funds are distributed in the same proportions as before,






in period one and
1−q
2 in period two. Candidate A maintains his equilibrium
allocation. This implies that θ1and θ2 increase by equal amounts15 as ωB
drops, that is, the increase in persuasiveness is spread equally over the two
periods. Thus, from equation 12 we see that there will be no extra eﬀect
from conﬁr m a t o r yb i a sa st h ev a l u eo fq(θ1 − θ2) is constant and equal to
zero. Neither rich- nor poor candidates derive any extra beneﬁts from the
presence of conﬁrmatory bias.
4.2 Media access
F i r s t l yw el oo ka th o wd i ﬀerential prices aﬀect the case with unbiased Bayesian
voters, then the case with voters suﬀering from conﬁrmatory bias.
By incorporating prices into the maximization problem of section 2 (see









































ωA+ωB.T h u s
decreasing ωB w i l lh a v et h es a m ee ﬀect on θ1 and θ2.
17t = {1,2}, i = {A,B},w h e r epi
t is the price of sending a message in period
t for candidate i. Decreasing the price for candidate A to send a message in
period one simply shifts the interior part of his best response correspondence
up while leaving the one of candidate B unaﬀected. Figure 9 illustrates this
eﬀect:
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Figure 9. Asymmetric prices, q =0 .
If voters suﬀer from conﬁrmatory bias, the eﬀect will be somehow diﬀer-
ent. Relaxing the assumption of equal prices unfortunately makes the prob-
lem of deriving analytical expressions for the equilibria very complicated so
I have to rely on graphical representation. Plotting the interior parts of the
best response correspondences for diﬀerent levels of pA
1 (for q =0 .6)w es e e
that the smaller is pA
1 the more is spent by candidate A in equilibrium in the
ﬁrst period and the less by candidate B:














Figure 10. Asymmetric prices, q =0 .6.
Candidate A will not only be able to send more messages as the average
price of sending a message is lower, but will also allocate a larger share of
his funds to period one as this is relatively cheap. This means that the
persuasiveness of candidate A’s period one campaign will increase more than
that of period two16. Comparing with the unbiased Bayesian updater case,
candidate A will, ceteris paribus, gain more voter support from a given price
diﬀerence with voters suﬀering from conﬁrmatory bias. Conﬁrmatory bias
would thus increase the advantage of better media access! From a policy
point of view, conﬁrmatory bias would thus strengthen the case for public
support to challengers in election campaigns.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The aim of this paper was to shed some light on the ﬁndings of Kenny and
McBurnett (1992) that candidates waiting very long to spend their campaign
funds are punished in terms of voter support. The psychological phenom-
enon of conﬁrmatory bias appeared to provide an intuitive explanation and
my model could also show this formally. The greater the severity of conﬁr-
matory bias the more of available funds are allocated by the candidates to
period one campaigning. When allowing for asymmetric budgets and media
16This can be veriﬁed by measuring the co-ordinates of the equilibria in the diagram
and then using these values in the expressions for θ1 and θ2.
19access, two results emerged. Firstly, the candidate with the largest budget
( u s u a l l yt h ei n c u m b e n t )d e r i v e st h es a m ea m o u n to fv o t e rs u p p o r tf r o ma n
electorate exhibiting conﬁr m a t o r yb i a sa sf r o mo n ew h od o e sn o t .S e c o n d l y ,
the candidate with better media access in period one (usually the incumbent)
does better if the electorate exhibits conﬁr m a t o r yb i a st h a ni fi td o e sn o t .
Thus, if incumbents, rich or poor, enjoy this media privilege, they gain from
conﬁrmatory bias. This ﬁnding strengthens the case for public support for
challengers in elections.
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21Appendix
A.1 Derivation of equation 2
In the mind of the voter, two, and only two, things can happen if he votes
for candidate B.
1) C = voting for candidate B yields a payoﬀ of zero.
2) D = voting for candidate B yields a payoﬀ of X.
The voter can each period receive either of two signals:
1) a = indicates C with correlation θt
2) b = indicates D with correlation 1 − θt
The model is designed such that the voter will receive signal a if θt > 0.5
and b if θt < 0.5. This is equivalent to the voter always receiving signal a
with correlation θt ∈ [0,1] (which is assumed in the text).
The voter forms his prior probability assessment about C b a s e do nt h e
period one signal. Thus; P(C)=θ1
In period two he receives signal a with correlation θ2. Hence; P(a | C)=
θ2. The voter’s updated probability assessment of C can be represented
according to Bayes theorem17;
P (C | a)=







P (a)=P (a ∩ C)+P (a ∩ D)=
= P (C)P (a | C)+( 1− P (C))(1 − P (a | C)) =
= θ1θ2 +( 1− θ1)(1− θ2)
Inserting this into equation 18 yields;
P (C | a)=
θ1θ2
θ1θ2 +( 1− θ1)(1− θ2)
Which corresponds to equation 2.
A.2 Second order conditions in the benchmark
case
If the second derivatives are negative, then we have diminishing returns
from campaign spending in each period. Taking the second order conditions
of Θ:






















































3 < 0 (20)
Where we see that we have, indeed, diminishing returns. Diminishing
returns and independence from party B’s expected allocation yields the result
in equation 11.
A.3 Derivation of equation 12
We want an expression for the ratio of perceived period two messages
where the number or perceived A messages equals CA
2 −q(1 − θ1)CA
2 +qθ1CB
2
and the number of perceived B messages equals CB
2 −qθ1CB
2 +q(1 − θ1)CA
2 .













2 + q(1 − θ1)CA
2
where the denominator consists of the sum of perceived messages which,

























2 = θ2 − q(1 − θ1)θ2 + qθ1(1 − θ2)
which can be simpliﬁed to:
θ
0
2 = θ2 + q(θ1 − θ2)
A.4 Derivation of equation 14






θ1[θ2 + q(θ1 − θ2)]





Inserting the contest success functions and using both candidates’ budget
constraints to substitute for CA
2 and CB
2 in equation 21 , setting ωA = ωB =




























































































and then assuming symmetry, that is, CA
1 = CB
1 , setting the expression
e q u a lt oz e r oa n ds o l v i n gf o rCA








A.5 Derivation of equations 15 and 16
Candidate A’s problem is the same as in section A.4 except for the fact




























As before I take the ﬁrst order condition. Setting this derivative equal
to zero and solving for CA∗
1 analytically as in section A.4 would be extremely
diﬃcult. Instead, based on the graphical representation of the equlibria, we
substitute CB
1 for our best guess, that is
ωB(1+q)















¢2 − (2qωA +( 1−
q)ωB)(−4CA
1 +( −1+q2)ωB))







1 assuming that CA∗
1 =
ωA(1+q)





Thus, the guess must be correct, and we have a ﬁxed point.
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